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Failures of the complex infrastructures society depends on having enormous human and
economic cost that poses the question: Are there ways to optimize these systems to reduce the
risks of failure? A dynamic model of one such system, the power transmission grid, is used to
investigate the risk from failure as a function of the system size. It is found that there appears to
be optimal sizes for such networks where the risk of failure is balanced by the benefit given by
the size.VC 2014 AIP Publishing LLC. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.4868393]
In 1928, Haldane wrote an essay1 on the right size of the
living beings. He pointed out how the physics laws and
the environment lead to the existence of a “right size” for
each of them. This has led to an entire area of biological
research, allometric studies,2–5 in which the biological
“system” is optimized for its function. He also speculated
that this concept could be applied to social organizations
and institutions. In our society, we are experiencing the
rapid expansion of all types of networks from physical
infrastructure networks to economic and social ones.
Because of the critical importance of many of the net-
works, and in the light of Haldane’s comments, it seems
appropriate to wonder if this expansion should continue
or if there is a “right” or optimal size for our nations’
critical complex infrastructure. To investigate the exis-
tence of a “right size” we will focus on a model of cascad-
ing failure in an evolving power transmission network.
The model is based on standard power grid equations7
and has been validated by approximately reproducing
statistical patterns of blackout size in the Western North
American power grid.11 We show that there is an optimal
size for the grid model based on a balance between effi-
ciency and risk of large failure. The existence of an opti-
mal size has important implications for planning, design,
and operation of the electrical grid upon which society
depends. It is plausible that many other complex systems
which exhibit similar characteristics and cascading fail-
ures also have an optimal size.
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to a near exponential increase in demand,
power transmission networks have been growing in size over
the years. The increasing size and interconnectivity of these
networks is important because it permits the supply of elec-
trical power from distant points when needed (utilizing a sur-
plus in one place to meet an excess demand in another). This
is designed to allow for continuous reliable operation of the
system and the avoidance of many interruptions of the
service.
The flip side of the size issue is that large connected net-
works are susceptible to large cascading failures, which can
propagate over a wide area of the network. Although these
failures are rare, they are very costly and are the penalty that
must be paid for large-scale interconnectivity. It is the dy-
namics of these cascading failures that cause a power tail in
the distribution of the blackout sizes,6 and it is the power law
tail that can make the risk of the large failures the dominant
risk to the system. The general issue of cascading failure in
power grids is reviewed in Refs. 8 and 24.
Because of this cost-benefit trade off, one may ask if
there is an optimal connected size (for the rest of the paper,
by connected size, we mean size of system with fully con-
nected elements) for the power system networks. A detailed
determination of this optimal size for a specific system
would require a detailed knowledge of the system and its
reliability, of the cost associated with large failures and other
non-trivial but knowable factors. However, the benefit of
finding such an optimum size would, of course, be to allow
planners to use this size as a design objective rather than
allowing the intrinsic pressure toward a “larger is better”
model to dominate the evolution of the infrastructure
systems.
Here, we show that for the power transmission grid
model, there is indeed an optimal size for the system to man-
age the risk of blackouts. Expanding beyond this size, the
network is no longer “economically” advantageous due to
the cost of failure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we give a summary description of the OPA model used in
the present research (OPA stands for “Oak Ridge National
Lab, Power Systems Engineering Research Center, Alaska”
which are the institutions involved in the invention and de-
velopment of the model). A comparison between networks
formed by several disconnected small network and large
compact networks with the same number of nodes is given in
Sec. III. A risk evaluation of these different types of
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networks is done in Sec. IV, and, in Sec. V, the concept of
an optimal size is introduced. Finally in Sec. VI, results are
discussed and the conclusions of this work are given.
II. THE OPA MODEL
To model the dynamics of the power transmission sys-
tem, we use the OPA model.7,8 OPA and its extensions have
been investigated by several research groups.9–11,17–23 The
OPA model calculates the long time behavior of cascading
transmission line outages of a power transmission system
under the dynamics of an increasing power demand, and the
engineering responses to failure. In this model, the power
demand increases at a constant rate and random fluctuations
modulate the daily loads. There are two sorts of upgrades to
meet the increase in demand. Transmission lines are
upgraded as engineering responses to blackouts, and maxi-
mum generator power is increased in response to the increas-
ing demand. The transmission lines selected for upgrade are
those transmission lines involved in a blackout. The trans-
mission lines are upgraded by increasing their maximum
flow limits. The generation power increases automatically
when the capacity margin is below a given critical level.
This can be done in different ways: by keeping the same
generation profile when statistical studies of an existing sit-
uation are studied, by randomly choosing the generators to
be upgraded, or by using a market model for upgrades, to
study the market impacts on system robustness.9,10
The OPA model for a given network represents trans-
mission lines, loads, and generators with the usual DC load
flow approximation. Starting from a solved base case, black-
outs are initiated by random line outages. Whenever a line is
outaged, the generation and load are redispatched using
standard linear programming methods. Since there is more
generation power than the load requires, one must choose
how to select and optimize the generation that is used to
exactly balance the load. The cost function for the optimiza-
tion is weighted to ensure that load shedding is avoided
where possible. If some of the lines were overloaded during
the optimization, then these lines are outaged with probabil-
ity p1. The process of redispatch and testing for outages is
iterated until there are no more outages. Then, the total load
shed is the power lost in the blackout.
Power generation patterns across the network are
adjusted as the outages progress to represent the ability of
the network to supply power across long distances. The main
input to OPA is a model network and has been validated on
the Western North American network using different size
network models and data from this network.11 The Western
North American network (the Western Electricity
Coordinating Council—WECC) covers the area west of the
Rocky Mountains and includes parts of Canada, USA, and
Mexico. In this work, we use a sequence of homogenous
100, 200, 400, 800, and 1600 node artificial networks gener-
ated with network characteristics built using the method of
Wang et al.12 The network degree (k) distribution is approxi-
mately Poisson with a mean k of !3, consistent with the
degree distribution found in many real power transmission
networks.13 In addition, the network is fully connected with
no isolated nodes or regions.
Of the six basic parameters that control the slow time
evolution of the system in OPA,7,8 four parameters have
been estimated from the data available for the US power
transmission grid14–16 and are shown in Table I (The demand
growth rate is the factor by which average load increases per
day, the critical generation margin controls how generators
are upgraded in meeting the load increase, the load variance
controls the stochastic variation of regional load about its av-
erage value, and the upgrade rate controls how much the
capacity of outaged lines involved in a blackout increases;
details are in Ref. 8). The other two model parameters, which
are very important in the determination of the dynamics are,
the probability p0 of failure of a component by a daily ran-
dom event and the probability p1 of an overload becoming
an outage. The first one represents the chances of random ac-
cidental failures while the second is a measure of the reliabil-
ity of system components and their interactions which
impacts the propagation of failures through the system.
Ranges for these too, can be estimated from data though
with less certainty. Therefore, several values, within the
range found to be reasonable for the western region of the
North American grid, of these two parameters will be consid-
ered in what follows.
III. LARGE SIZE NETWORK VERSUS MULTIPLE
SMALL NETWORKS
To investigate the importance of connected size, we
compare the failures in a large network with the failures in a
system formed by several independent, disconnected, small
networks with the same total number of nodes as the large
network we are comparing to. For instance, we compare the
1600 node network with 16 independent, unconnected, 100
node networks. We do the same for the other network sizes
thereby allowing the exploration of the importance of the
connected size of the system rather than just the total number
of nodes. In the work that follows, we assume that the total
power demand is proportional to the network size N.
In Fig. 1(a), we plot the frequency of blackouts (simply
the number of blackouts divided by the number of simulation
“days” in which a cascade can occur) vs. the number of
nodes (N) for different combinations of 100 node networks
with the frequency of blackouts from connected networks
with the same number of nodes for p0¼ 0.00025 and
p1¼ 0.037. The blackout frequency is systematically higher
for the multiple networks, because the large networks are
more effective in providing power to all nodes when there
are large fluctuations in demand. This is because there are
TABLE I. Parameters used.
Variable name Symbol Value
Daily rate of increase of the demand k 1.00005
Critical generation margin DP/P 0.2
Variance of loads c 1.15
Upgrade rate l 1.07
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more sources of power and more routes from the sources to
the sinks in the larger systems and is a cause of the increased
efficiency of the larger networks.
The averaged load shed normalized to the power demand
per blackout vs. the number of nodes is practically the same
for the large connected networks as it is for the multiple 100
node networks, as can be seen in Fig. 1(b). This result appears
to hold for all the sets of parameters (the various values of p0
and p1) that we have considered and would superficially sug-
gest that the bigger connected system is “better.”
However, most importantly, the distribution of the load
shed during a blackout for the multiple independent net-
works is very different than the corresponding distribution
for the large networks (Fig. 2). For the same sequence of net-
works and parameters as in Fig. 1, we have plotted in Fig.
2(a) comparison of the complementary cumulative distribu-
tions for the normalized load shed (LS/P) for different size
networks with 200, 400, 800, and 1600 nodes. We can see
that for the multiple 100 node networks, the tail of the rank
function is essentially exponential. However, for the large
connected size networks, a power law tail emerges; there is
evidence for the power law in the 800 nodes networks, but it
is clear for 1600 nodes. The emergence of this tail makes the
probability of the large blackouts decrease much more
slowly as blackout size increases.
The simulation results also show that medium size
blackouts occur significantly more frequently in the multiple
100 node networks. In the large connected size networks, the
large blackouts, although less frequent, increase greatly in
relative frequency as a result of increasing the number of
nodes. The emergence of the power tail for the large net-
works is characteristic of a system displaying critical behav-
ior and is the main drawback of these large complex
systems. This is why the advantage of a wider range of
FIG. 1. The left panel (a) shows the
frequency of outages as a function of
the number of nodes with the fre-
quency increasing much more rapidly
for the multiple unconnected 100 node
regions (circles) than for the connected
single regions (squares). The right
panel (b) shows that the normalized
average blackout size is approximately
the same for both systems and gets
smaller with size.
FIG. 2. These figures show the com-
plementary cumulative distribution
function (CCDF) calculated by ranking
the normalized load shed for the
sequence of increasing size networks
compared to the same size system of
unconnected 100 node networks.
Normalized load shed is the load shed
divided by the total load power before
the blackout.
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power dispatch options can turn into the large disadvantage
of the increased risk of very large blackouts due to the
increased probability of large cascading failures.
IV. THE RISK OF BLACKOUTS
To make a comparative evaluation of the impact of dif-
ferent types of blackouts, we introduce a measure of the risk.
The risk associated with failure i can be defined17 as:
Risk ið Þ ¼ Probability ið Þ Cost ið Þ: (1)
While we can directly evaluate the probability of an
event from the model calculation, it is more difficult and
controversial to determine the cost associated with the event
and the cost savings from a larger interconnected network.
One way of evaluating the cost is by setting the cost propor-
tional to the energy lost during the blackout.25 Then we can
write, with A being a constant,
Cost ¼ A$ Power lost$ Duration of blackout: (2)
Since we lack direct information about the duration of
the blackout (the time it takes for the system to be restored),
we assume that the duration is proportional to the size of the
blackout and therefore to the power lost. Using Eq. (2), we
can re-write Eq. (1) for an event with load shed L as
Risk ðLÞ ¼ BP2 probability ðLÞ L
P
! "2
: (3)
In Eq. (3), B is a constant, P is the total power demand,
and L/P is therefore the normalized load shed. Once again, in
what follows, we also assume that the total power demand is
proportional to the network size N. In Fig. 3, we compare the
risk function for the case of multiple 100 networks and the
two large networks.
When we compare the risk function for the case of mul-
tiple 100 networks to that for large networks, we find the risk
for the multiple 100-node networks has a large peak, due to
high frequency of the blackouts, at medium values of load
shed, while in contrast, the large networks show a slowly
decreasing tail for very large values of load shed. Therefore,
FIG. 3. These figures show the normal-
ized risk as a function of normalized
load shed for a homogeneous 800 bus
network and 8 independent 100 bus
networks (left) and a homogeneous
1600 bus network and 16 independent
100 bus networks (right). These show
a much larger risk from the larger
events in the homogenous systems.
FIG. 4. The risk index R (normalized
to the constant B) is plotted versus the
system size for four cases for four val-
ues of p1.
FIG. 5. The risk index R (normalized to the constant B) is plotted versus the
system size for three base system sizes for the same value of p1.
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the cost of the large events may dominate the overall risk as
the size of the system increases. This dominance depends on
how fast the cost of the events increases with its size and
how fast its probability decreases.
It is useful to have a compact measure of the over-
all risk by integrating Eq. (3), which we define as an
index
R ! 1
P
ðP
0
Risk
L
P
" #
dL: (4)
In Fig. 4, we have plotted the risk index R, normalized
to the constant B, for four sequences, they correspond to
p1¼ 0.075, p1¼ 0.037, p1¼ 0.018, and p1¼ 0.009, with
p0¼ 0.00025 for all four cases.
We can see that, for p1¼ 0.037, around N¼ 1000, the
multiple 100 node networks become more cost effective than
the large size networks. For p1¼ 0.075, the crossing point is
about N¼ 500. As the reliability increases, the crossing point
moves to a larger value of N. For the other two values of p1
the crossing point is beyond the maximum size of the net-
work used in the present calculations.
For the combined multiple networks, the risk increases
uniformly with the total size, where the total size is the
base network size times the number of networks. The expo-
nent of the rate of increase does not seem to depend on the
size of the base network unit. We can see that the results
are similar if we consider 100 node or 200 node or 400
node base networks. This is shown in Fig. 5 for the case
p1¼ 0.075.
FIG. 6. The risk ratio is plotted versus
the system size for four values of p1
and two (or three) values of the base
system size (100, 200, and 400 in the
highest p1 case).
TABLE II. Optimal size of the network for different values of p1 for the risk
ratios constructed from the 100 node base system sizes.
p1 Optimal size No
0.075 230
0.037 332
0.028 449
0.018 656
0.009 1895
FIG. 7. The risk ratio plotted versus the system size for a small value of p1,
p1¼ 0.009, and two values of the base system size (100 and 200).
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V. OPTIMAL SIZE OFA NETWORK
The idea of an optimal size of a network is based on the
comparison of a homogenous large network with an equiva-
lent size system formed by a combination of a set of uncon-
nected smaller networks. It can also be defined as a relative
concept. Therefore, the optimal size will, in principle,
depend on the size of the smaller networks that we used for
comparison.
Here, calculating the relative risks, we compare the inte-
grated risk of a homogeneous network to the integrated risk of
multiple non-connected networks with the same number of
nodes. To do this comparison, we look at the ratio of the inte-
grated risk for both types of networks. For unconnected net-
works, we will not only consider systems base on multiple 100
node networks but also multiple 200 node and 400 node net-
works. The results for four values of p1 are plotted in Fig. 6.
The optimal size corresponds to the minimum of the ra-
tio. The first curious thing is that the value of the minimum
does not seem to depend on the sequence of multiple net-
works considered. Using a simple quadratic fit to the results
plotted in Fig. 6, we can evaluate the optimal size for each of
the values of p1. The results are given in Table II.
If we further increase the reliability of the network to
values probably higher than reasonable for our present day
networks, the minimum shifts above the maximum size of
the network used in these calculations. This can be seen in
Fig. 7 for the case with p1¼ 0.009.
From Table II, we can see that the optimal size, No,
increases as we increase the reliability of the network as can
be expected. Plotting the optimal size vs p1 shows a roughly
1/p1 relationship as seen in Fig. 8.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Many large dynamical infrastructure systems display
power law tails in the size distribution function of their fail-
ures. It is often the “near critical7,27” nature of these complex
systems coming from the competing forces on the system
that generates the power law tail in the probability of failure
as the system gets larger, and it is this tail that leads to the
dominance of the cost over the benefit beyond a crossover
point in size.
The question “Is there an optimal size?” seems to have
at the least a qualified “yes” as the answer in our model of a
power transmission grid. In this generic model of the power
transmission system, a range of size values exists beyond
which the risk from large failures starts to dominate the over-
all risk to the system. This suggests that there is a size at
which the balance between more efficient distribution of
power leading to a reduction of relative frequency of failures
and risk of ever larger cascading failure is optimized. An in-
triguing implication of this is that heterogeneous networks
made up of a series of weakly coupled homogeneous regions
each with tight internal coupling might be a method for
exploiting the best of both worlds. These considerations
become even more interesting as the grid and its reliability
changes due to the increasing penetration of highly variable
renewable generation.26
In this study of transmission network failures, the balance
of efficiency with cost of large failure leads to an optimal size
range in which increasing the network size to that point
improves the system but beyond which degrades it. This opti-
mal network size range depends on details of the reliability of
the system and how the cost function of the failures scale with
the system size. While this work focuses on the power trans-
mission grid, it is likely that other systems which have cascad-
ing failures and therefore the heavy tails will exhibit this type
optimal size in contrast to systems which have uncorrelated
random failures. Because many complex dynamical systems
have cascading failures and the characteristics that come with
them as well as similar underlying mechanisms for generating
these characteristics, it is plausible that this is a general prop-
erty of complex infrastructure systems. It will be interesting to
see how broadly this property applies; that is, what other net-
worked infrastructure systems that show cascading failure and
complex dynamics have such an optimum size for similar rea-
sons. In particular, coupled complex infrastructure systems
have been shown to have the large size events
disproportionally28–30 enhanced by the coupling that would
tend to reduce the optimal size produced by the mechanism
described here.
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